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The demand for organic fresh fruits and vegetable continues to grow at a rate far higher than the
rest of the produce industry.  The cost of meeting organic certification standards, however, has
meant that supply has been slow to adjust.  With limited supply, we hypothesize that organic
suppliers enjoy more market power in bargaining over their share of the retail-production cost
margin for fresh apples.  We test this hypothesis using a random parameters, generalized extreme
value demand model (mixed logit) combined with a structural model of retail and wholesale
pricing that allows conduct to vary by product attributes (organic or non-organic) and time. We
find that organic growers do indeed earn a larger share of the total margin than non-organic
growers, but this vertical market power is eroding over time as market supply adjusts. 
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Introduction
The margin earned on organic relative to conventional agricultural products is a critical variable
in determining the future growth of organic supply (Ehmke, et al., 2004).  From a grower’s
perspective, organics represent an opportunity to develop a “value added” strategy without
investing in processing facilities.  Adopting organic production methods, however, requires an
investment in both new knowledge and equipment and abandoning relatively low-cost chemical-
based practices.  Clearly, margins for organic produce must be sufficiently high to make the
investment worthwhile.  Organic produce currently sells for a significant premium over non-
organic produce in most categories, but it is not clear whether these high prices are due to
retailers exploiting strong consumer demand, or if retail prices simply reflect higher production
costs.  If retailers are exploiting what monopsony buying power they may possess to keep farm
prices for organic produce low, then supplier margins are not likely to justify further growth in
the industry.  On the other hand, if the limited supply of organic produce provides suppliers with
a measure of market power, then further investment is likely and retail-farm margins should
decline over time (Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  Which of these two outcomes is
consistent with the existing data is the empirical question that this study seeks to resolve. 
Organic food products represent perhaps the most significant innovation in the food and
agriculture industry in the last 30 years.  Between 2005 and 2006, organic food sales in the U.S.
rose 22% from $13.8 billion to $17.0 billion (Organic Consumers Association).  While relatively
mature organic categories grew only modestly over this period (organic fruits and vegetables,
7.0%) other categories are growing much more rapidly on a smaller sales base (dairy products,
27.0%).  Nonetheless, fruits and vegetables accounted for $4.3 billion (42%) of the organic food Among recent studies that use a similar approach to that used here, Berto Villas-Boas (2007) finds that
1
yogurt wholesalers price at marginal cost and retailers set profit-maximizing prices, while Bonnet, Dubois and
Simioni (2006) cannot reject a model in which wholesalers exercise retail price maintenance in the French bottled
water market.    
2
market in 2003 and were expected to grow to $8.5 billion by 2010 (Nutrition Business Journal). 
Consumer surveys show that this trend is largely driven by market demands for food that is
perceived to be free of chemical residue, is more environmentally friendly, supports local farmers
and is more likely to be free of pathogens that lead to food-borne diseases (Thompson, 1998;
Whole Foods, 2004).  At least initially, organics offered many retailers an opportunity to
differentiate themselves from traditional supermarkets – witness the rapid growth of Whole
Foods and Wild Oats (since merged) during the 1990's and early 2000's.  In most retail markets,
organics carry significant price premiums (Lohr,1998; Huang and Lin, 2007).  Premium prices,
however, do not necessarily imply high margins. 
There is some question in the literature as to which party in the food supply chain –
retailers or suppliers – possesses bargaining power in their relationship with the other.   While it
1
may be the case that suppliers can exercise vertical market power when products are being
promoted (Richards and Patterson, 2005), when there is a short harvest (Sexton and Zhang,
1996) or for a number of other reasons (Draganska and Klapper, 2007), retail concentration can
lead to buying power on the other side (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007).  When the conditions that
lead to supplier market power are transitory, however, excess margins can be short-lived.  Such is
believed to be the case with organic food products (Blank and Thompson, 2004; Oberholtzer,
Dimitri and Greene, 2005), particularly when price and availability are regarded by consumers as
the top-two most critical barriers to purchasing more organic produce (Hartman, 2002).  Sales of3
organic products in virtually all categories continue to grow at double-digit rates, despite
anecdotal evidence that the supply of truly organic products in many categories is chronically
short.  At the same time, many retailers rely on a consistent supply of high-quality organic
products to help remake their image as innovative, current and in-tune with changing consumer
tastes (The Packer).  The empirical analysis described in this paper tests whether these conditions
lead to higher or lower supplier margins for organic apples in the U.S.  Specifically, we seek to
empirically examine the impact of introducing organic products on vertical market power
exercised by suppliers within traditional grocery product supply chains.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes a structural econometric
model of the U.S. fresh apple market, including both the retail and supply sectors.  The second
section describes the data used in the analysis and the estimation methods used to implement the
econometric model.  A third section presents the estimation results and calculations concerning
the allocation of operating margins between retailers and suppliers.  A fourth section concludes
and draws some implications for other organic and non-organic product markets. 
Econometric Model of Organic Apple Pricing 
We model the market for organic and non-organic apples using a structural model of consumer,
retailer and supplier (wholesaler, or packer) behavior.  Retailers and suppliers are assumed to
behave strategically in their horizontal and vertical interactions.  To model these interactions, our
framework consists of consumer demand and retail / wholesale pricing models that are estimated
sequentially.4
Consumer Demand
Consumer demand is represented by a random utility specification in which consumers are
assumed to make a discrete choice of one apple variety from among those represented in our
retail data sample, or some other apple variety from another outlet.  This latter alternative is
defined as the outside option.  The utility consumer i obtains from consuming product j during
jt week t is a function of the product’s price (p  ) and mean level of utility, or product-specific
ijt il preferences, ã , and a set of individual-specific attributes (z ):
jt where î  is an error term that accounts for all product-specific variation in demand that is
unobserved to the researcher such as the appearance of the apples, the internal or eating quality,
ijt the amount of shelf-space allocated to each variety or unmeasured advertising, and g  is an i.i.d.
type I extreme value error term that accounts for consumer-specific heterogeneity in preferences. 
With this error assumption, the utility specification in (1) implies a logit discrete choice demand
model.  
Because each variety is available in both organic and non-organic form, however, we
extend the simple logit model to consider the hierarchical nature of a consumer’s choice process:
consumers first choose whether to buy an organic or non-organic apple, and then the specific
ijt variety.  Consequently, we modify the distributional assumption governing g  by allowing it to
follow instead a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV, McFadden, 1978) distribution.  With the
GEV assumption, we allow for differing degrees of substitution among products within each
(1)5
group: organics and non-organics.  In terms of the utility model introduced in (1), the GEV
extension involves including a composed error such that: 
ijt where ô  is an error-component (Cardell, 1997) that makes the entire term: 
extreme-value distributed as well.  The aggregate probability that consumer i purchases product j
in group J (organic or non-organic from a retail supermarket) or the market share, is given by the
product of the conditional probability of buying within a particular group and the probability of
the group as a whole, or:  
j where ä is the mean utility of product j, or the part of utility that does not vary over consumers,
i j|J and n is the part that does, s  is the share of product j among either the organic or non-organic
J group, s  is the share of group J in overall apple sales, and   represents the
inclusive value from purchasing from group J so that    Faced with a total
market size of M, therefore, the quantity sold of product j is written as:   
As is well known, however, the GEV model still suffers from the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property within groups, which means that the substitution elasticities
(2)
(3)6
between products depends only on their market shares and not on more fundamental attributes
that are likely to influence demand.  Consequently, we allow the product-preference and marginal
utility of income parameters in (3) to vary over consumers in a random way (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (BLP), 1995; Nevo, 2001; McFadden and Train, 2000).  Specifically, the marginal
utility of income is normally distributed over consumers so that:
i where á is the mean price response across all consumers and í is the consumer-specific variation
á in response with parameter ó .  Similar to Erdem (1996) and Nair, Dube, and Chintagunta
jk (2005), we also assume that product-specific preferences depend on the attributes (x ) of each
product, j:
iot j where the attributes include a constant term (ã ), a binary discount variable (d) that assumes a
value of 1.0 if the product is reduced in price by at least 10% from one week to the next, and then
returned to its previous value in the following week, an interaction term between the discount
jj and price (dp) and a time trend, t.  Consumers are assumed to differ in their preference for each
product attribute so that unobserved consumer heterogeneity is reflected in the distribution of
each nutrient’s marginal utility:




of attribute demand.  In contrast to the IIA property of a simple logit model, the heterogeneity
assumption in (6) creates a general pattern of substitution over alternatives j through the
unobserved, random part of the utility function given in (1).  As a result, the utility from different
j apple varieties is correlated according to their set of attributes included in x.  Non-IIA
substitution is critical in models of differentiated product pricing because inferences regarding
either upstream or downstream market power would otherwise be entirely confounded by mis-
estimates of the partial elasticity of demand facing each product. 
With a discrete choice model of demand, it is assumed that each consumer purchases only
one unit of the chosen product.  Because our data measures aggregate market shares, therefore,
we aggregate over the distribution of consumer heterogeneity to arrive at an expression for the
share of each apple variety out of the entire market for apples.  Essentially, market share is the
sum of individual purchase probabilities for each product.  Because the mixed logit model
introduces a large number of parameters relative to the simple logit model, we follow Nevo
(2001), among others, and write the indirect utility function in terms of two sets of variables –
those that are assumed to be random and those that are not:   
jt ijt where ä  is the mean level of utility that varies over products, but not consumers, and ö  is the
ik i idiosyncratic part that varies by consumer and product.  Define the densities of ì  and í as f(ì)
and g(í), respectively, so that the market share of product j, obtained by integrating over the
distributions reflecting consumer heterogeneity, becomes: 
(7)8
which can then be estimated in aggregate data using simulated maximum likelihood (SML)
algorithms (Train, 2003).  Simulation methods are required to estimate the demand-side model
because there is no closed form-expression for market share as in the simple logit case (Berry,
1994).
 
Organic Produce Pricing Game
While there are few recognized brands in the U.S. apple market, we assume apples are
differentiated by variety.  Therefore, we assume the wholesale sector consists of several suppliers
– one for each apple variety.  Given the aggregate nature of our retail data, we characterize the
organic marketing channel as consisting of a single, multi-product retailer, and multiple
suppliers.  Although there are clearly many suppliers and retailers in reality, we gain nothing by
modeling individual behavior, because our focus is on market power relationships between the
retail sector and consumers downstream, and retailers and suppliers upstream. Consistent with
the literature on retail pricing, the retailer behaves as a Stackelberg follower: the suppliers specify
wholesale prices given their expectations of how the retailer will respond, and the retailer then
sets prices paid by consumers.  We solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the usual
way: by working backward from the retailer to the suppliers’ problem.
Beginning with the retailer decision, and suppressing the time period index (t) for clarity,
(8) We refer to the wholesale price throughout as the price nearest the grower. In our data, the wholesale price
2
is defined as a “packing-house door” price, so represents grower returns plus packing and handling costs.  
9
j the retailer sets a price for each product, p, each week to solve the following problem: 
jj j where  M is total market demand, w is the wholesale price, r are unit retailing costs, and s is the
market share defined above.   Retailing costs are assumed to be constant, which is plausible
2
given the share of store-sales accounted for by any individual product.  Under the manufacturer-
Stackelberg assumption, the retailer sets prices taking wholesale prices as given.   
We assume the retailer sets prices recognizing the interrelated nature of differentiated
product demand such that he or she internalizes all intra-store pricing externalities (behaves as a
perfect category manager).  Consequently, the retailer’s first-order condition for product j is
given by: 
for all J products in the store.  Stacking the first-order conditions for all products and solving for
retail prices in matrix notation gives: 




p product-specific retailing input prices, S is an J x 1 vector of market shares, and S  is a J x J
matrix of share-derivatives with respect to all retail prices.  Because the suppliers take the
retailer’s optimal response into account in setting upstream prices, equation (11) represents the
retail decision rule that frames their pricing decisions. 
Suppliers are assumed to set wholesale prices in order to maximize the surplus over
production costs for the product they sell, conditional on the retailer’s response.  Again assuming
each supplier packs only one of the varieties sold by the retailer, the profit maximization problem
faced by supplier j is given by:  
j where c is the (constant) production cost of product j incurred by the supplier and the other
variables are as described above.  The first-order conditions for the supplier have to take into
account the effect of changes in the price of product j and all other prices so are written as: 
which is simply an expression of the supplier’s vertical pricing problem taking the retailer’s best
reply into account.  As in Sudhir (2001) and Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), we derive expressions
for the wholesale price derivatives (pass-through rates) by totally differentiating the retail first-
order conditions to find:    
(12)
(13) Detailed derivations of each matrix are available from the authors, but are similar to Villas-Boas and Zhao
3
(2005) and Berto Villas-Boas (2007). Note that these parameters are also interpreted as measuring the extent of
deviation from the maintained behavioral assumption - monopoly for the retailer and Bertrand-Nash for the
suppliers. 
11
jk which can be simplified by defining a J x J matrix G with typical element g  such that: 
Using this expression to write the wholesale margin becomes: 
N where I  is a J x J identity matrix and * indicates element-by-element multiplication.   
To this point, all of parameters required to identify the equilibrium margins are contained
p in the demand side estimates (S  and G) and from the estimated marginal cost functions.  
3
Marginal retailing and wholesaling costs, in turn, are estimated as linear functions of input prices,
rw v  and v  such that:  and   for retailing and
wholesaling costs, respectively.  These functions are estimated after substituting the demand




Retailer and Supplier Behavior
In this model, the implicit assumption is that both the retailer and suppliers optimize according to
the structure of the game and, as such, there is no deviation from the theoretical equilibrium.  As
Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and Draganska and Klapper (2007) suggest, however, there is likely
to be asymmetrical market power relationships or other factors that cause the actual outcomes to
differ from these theoretical expectations.  We hypothesize that the critical factor to consider is
whether a supplier sells organic or conventional produce.  Therefore, we allow for deviations
from either the profit-maximizing monopoly choices on the part of the retailer or the Bertrand-
Nash decisions by the suppliers by introducing parameters in (11) and (16) that measure the
deviation of the retail margin (ö) and supplier margin (è) from the maintained assumption: 
for the retailer, and:
for the suppliers.  We allow each deviation parameter to depend on whether a product is organic
or non-organic to test our hypotheses regarding the effect of organic status on margin behavior. 
Therefore, both parameters are written as linear functions of a constant term, a binary indicator of
organic-status and a time-trend variable interacted with the organic binary variable:
j and  where O takes a value of 1 if a
1 supplier or retailer sells organic produce and 0 otherwise.  If ö  > 0, then the retailer earns higher
(17)
(18)13
1 margins on organic products in the downstream market than non-organics.  Similarly, if è  > 0
then an organic supplier earn higher margins upstream.  If organics are in short supply as media
reports suggest, then the supplier holds the upper hand in bargaining over the allocation of
surplus generated through the retail sale, or the total margin between the consumer and grower. 
22 Further, if ö  < 0 then any organic-premium earned by the retailer erodes over time, or if è  < 0
then the supplier’s market power declines over time.  Calculating fitted values of each deviation
parameter allows us to test the maintained structure of the game (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005;
Draganksa and Kapper, 2007).  Namely, if:  then the retailer (suppliers) price above the
assumed level, and if:   then the retailer (suppliers) price below the level consistent
with the solution assumptions described above.  Of course, values of either parameter equal to
zero suggest a situation in which neither seller – either at the retail or wholesale level – takes into
account the markup available from selling differentiated products.  In this case, margins are equal
to zero and perfect competition on a product-by-product basis ensues.  We test for each of these
possible outcomes using the retail and wholesale data described next.  
   
Data Description: Fresh Apples 
Data Description
Retail volume and shipment data for this study are from Fresh Look Marketing, Inc., and
describe shelf prices and retail volume movement on a weekly basis from January 1, 2005 Namely, the prices reported by retailers, and as reported by the WGCH in this case, do not reflect retailer-
4
specific deals, quantity discounts and other non-invoice items that are typically part of the contract terms. 
14
through December 31, 2007.  Both prices and shipments are measured at a market-aggregate
level for five metropolitan statistical areas (Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles and New
York).  In each case, the market aggregate is comprised of all major retailers that participate in
retail scanner syndication programs, consequently we do not measure sales through club stores or
supercenters that do not participate.  Over the five markets, the all-commodity volume (ACV), or
share of the market included in the scanner data, is 71.0%.  
Grower prices for both organic and regular apples (FOB) are from the Washington
Growers Clearing House (WGCH), which is the primary repository for grower-level price and
shipment data for all fruit shipped in the state of Washington.  Prices include both regular and
controlled-atmosphere shipments, so the prices used for this study represent a weighted average
of both regular and controlled atmosphere, and are defined as packing-house door prices. 
Table 1 summarizes both the retail and grower apple price data.  Our observations that
motivate this research and as described in the introduction are confirmed by inspecting the data
shown here.  Specifically, the market share for each organic variety is only a fraction of the non-
organic equivalent, but both retail and wholesale prices are far higher for most organics relative
to non-organics.  Although retail-farm price spreads are only imperfect measures of the retail
margin for the reasons described in Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002), comparing the retail-
farm price spreads in this table suggest that suppliers may enjoy some sort of leverage over their
retail buyers as the absolute and relative spreads are far higher than for non-organics.   These
4
margins, however, may be absorbed by higher production and distribution costs, so testing the15
central hypotheses of the paper requires a more detailed statistical analysis that takes each type of
cost into account.  
[table 1 in here]
The input prices used to estimate the marginal cost function also serve as instruments
(interacted with market binary variables) in estimating the  margin equations.  Because we
estimate marginal retailing and production costs, we need two sets of input prices.  Retailing
costs are assumed to depend on labor and energy prices.  Labor costs are represented by wages
earned by supermarket laborers and retail managers.  Both series are from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).  Energy prices are proxied by electricity price indices for each market in the
retail data set and are also from the BLS.  Production cost, on the other hand, is determined by a
number of inputs used in agricultural production: farm labor wages, and prices for fertilizer,
chemicals, fuels, supplies and services.  Each of these indices is from the Economic Research
Service of the USDA (ERS).  Because of the short time period covered by our data, adjusting for
inflation made no difference to the estimation results.  
For the mixed logit model, demographic data are required for each market in order to
describe the observed heterogeneity among households.  Because we do not have household-level
data, however, we follow the convention in this literature (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007; Nevo, 2001)
and draw demographic data randomly from each of our sample markets using the Current
Population Survey (CPS) from the Bureau of Census.  From the available data, we choose age,
education (highest level attained) and household income as the primary demographic descriptors. 
In the empirical model, it was found that only age and education contribute significantly to the
variation in product-specific preferences over time. 16
In models of strategic pricing behavior, the variables of interest are typically endogenous,
both in the demand and pricing models.  For the demand model, we estimate the mixed logit
model using simulated maximum likelihood.  Because this is a full information method, it
provides consistent estimates when the set of explanatory variables may include endogenous
variables.  In this case, retail prices are endogenous.  With respect to the pricing model, however,
we estimate using an instrumental variables approach in order to identify the conduct parameters
when both retail and wholesale margins are endogenous. For this purpose, we require instruments
that are correlated with the endogenous variables, but not the unobservables in the pricing
equation.  Unobservable factors that are likely to influence marketing margins for apples include
such things as local transportation or supply constraints, variation in apple quality, the amount of
exports entering the local market or marketing strategies specific to individual distributors that
are obscured in the aggregate data.  Following others in this literature (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007;
Draganska and Klapper, 2007) we use a variety of instruments.  First, we interact retail and
production input prices with the set of market binary variables.  Market-specific variation in costs
will be correlated with prices in the same market, but not likely to be correlated with
unobservable factors in the margin equations.  Second, we include a set of lagged share and
margin values in order to pick up any pre-determined pricing effects.  Third, we include product-
specific binary variables to account for idiosyncratic supply or quality factors that are
unobservable to the econometrician but are clearly important in determining either wholesale or
retail margins. 
Estimation Method17
The demand model is estimated using the method of simulated maximum likelihood (SML,
Train, 2003).  SML uses Monte Carlo simulation to solve the integral in (8) up to an
approximation that is accurate to the number of random draws chosen, R. This method provides
consistent parameter estimates under general error assumptions and is readily able to
accommodate complex structures regarding consumer heterogeneity.  In order to speed the
estimation process, we simulate the multi-dimensional integral that defines the distribution of
heterogeneity using R draws from a Halton sequence (Train, 2003; Bhat, 2003).  We find that R =
50 draws are sufficient to produce stable estimates without excessive estimation time.  Bhat
(2003) provides experimental evidence that shows Halton sequences can reduce the number of
draws required to produce estimates at a given accuracy by a factor of 10.  For the margin
equations, we use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in order to account for the
endogeneity of retail and wholesale that are calculated from the first-stage SML estimates.  We
estimate equations (17) and (18) together as a set in order to take advantage of the efficiency
gains associated with any contemporaneous correlation between the equations.  Sequential
estimation of the demand and margin equations in this way is common in the literature and has
been shown to differ little from simultaneous estimation (Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005).  Further,
we restricted the mean conduct parameter to be equal for all varieties because they are sold under
the same game structure.  Conduct, therefore, varies over time and by organic status (organic or
non-organic). 
Results and Discussion18
In this section, we first present and discuss the demand-system estimates, and then tests of the
central hypotheses of the paper with, first, a model that includes only retail margins, and then a
second model that includes both retail (downstream) and wholesale (upstream) margins. 
As a first step in interpreting the demand model results, we test the validity of the
random-parameter GEV model against both a simple logit model and a GEV model with constant
parameters.  Testing a GEV model against a simple logit alternative involves the GEV scale
JJ parameter,  ó .  If ó  = 0, then the GEV model collapses to a simple logit.  In the results shown in
J table 2, the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that ó  = 0 is 204.401 so we easily reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that the GEV model is preferred.  Next, we compare the random-
parameter GEV to a constant parameter alternative.  For this purpose, we use a likelihood ratio
test where the constant parameter model is the restricted and the random parameter the
unrestricted version.  The LR statistic for this test is 8,042.46, so  with 7 degrees of freedom we
again reject the simpler for the more comprehensive model.  Other specification tests evaluate the
specific form of the random parameter GEV specified here.  Clearly, the options for specifying
the nature of the heterogeneity driving product-specific preferences and the marginal utility of
income are nearly limitless.  In the current application, we allowed the constant term of the
i0 product-specific preference parameter, ã , to vary by age and income.  The results in table 2
show that the education effect is significant at a 5% level, but age is only significant at 15%. 
However, heterogeneity in the marginal utility of income – the price parameter – depends
significantly on both age and education.  Moreover, the scale parameters for both the price and
constant terms are significantly different from zero.  Therefore, we can conclude that the random
parameter model is preferred to the constant-parameter alternative so will use this version to19
interpret the demand results.
In the demand model, the key parameters of interest are the own-price effect, the
discount-effect, the discount-price interaction and the GEV scale parameter.  The own-price
effect – measured by the marginal utility of income – is non-positive, as expected, and increases
with both age and education.  Temporarily discounting apples in the current week causes demand
to shift outwards and rotate clockwise, or become less elastic.  This is also an expected result and
suggests that apples, in general, are conducive to price promotions.  Among other variables
included in the demand model, the time-trend indicates that the demand for apples is moving
upward, albeit slowly, over time.  Given that New York is the excluded market variable, apples
in all other markets except Los Angeles have a lower share than in New York.  Further, the
variety-specific effects suggest that all varieties have lower marginal shares (share of the total
apple market) than regular Red Delicious apples.  Finally, the GEV scale parameter represents a
measure of the extent to which apples substitute for each other within a market, where 1.0
indicates perfect substitutability.  From the estimate in table 2, it is clear that apples are highly
substitutable for each other in general, but more specific information on the degree of
substitutability, however, is provided in the elasticity matrix (table 2a).
[table 2a in here]
Perhaps the most important thing to notice from the matrix of elasticities is that the
random parameter GEV model is not subject to the IIA problem.  Non-constant cross-price
elasticities show that correlation in demand across varieties driven by the random parameter
assumption causes like products to be more substitutable than those that are fundamentally
different.  Organic apples are relatively weak substitutes for each other, while non-organic apples20
are more readily substitutable.  It is also apparent from these results that all apple varieties are
elastic in demand, and there appears to be little difference between organic and non-organic
apples in terms of their demand elasticity.  This is somewhat surprising, but could represent one
indication that the organic apple market is beginning to mature.  
[table 2b in here] 
The demand estimates shown in table 2a are then used to recover estimates of the retail
and wholesale margins according to equations (17) and (18) and subsequently used to estimate
the extent to which retailers or suppliers are able to capture margins that are different from zero. 
That is, if the estimates of ö differ from zero, then the retailer earns greater margins than are
implied by monopoly pricing in a multi-product context (category management), and if è differs
from zero, suppliers earn above-competitive margins. 
We begin by estimating equation (17) on its own in order to demonstrate how retail
margins behave for organics and non-organics if supplier relationships are not taken into account. 
Estimates of this model are shown in table 3, while table 4 presents the estimates from a more
complete model of vertical and horizontal competition.  Table 3 provides estimates from both
least-squares and GMM estimates.  Because a Wu-Hausman endogeneity test strongly rejects the
null hypothesis that retail margins are exogenous (chi-square = 45.67 compared to a critical value
at 5.0% of 3.84) we know that the GMM estimator is appropriate, but we present both sets of
results to demonstrate the extent of bias that results when endogeneity is ignored.  Both sets of
estimates suggest that retail margins for non-organic apples in the base time period (t = 0) are far
more competitive than the maintained multi-product monopoly equilibrium, but are still above
the zero-margin benchmark.  Comparing the least squares and GMM estimates, the former shows21
only a slight, yet statistically significant, deviation from the perfectly competitive level, while the
GMM estimates imply a difference near five times as large (0.037 versus 0.164).  Further, the
least squares estimates find an “organic effect,” or the difference between the deviation of
organic and non-organic retail margins from the maintained pricing assumption, approximately
one-fifth that of the GMM estimates.  Both estimators, however, find a small upward trend in the
organic effect, albeit significant only at a 10.0% level.  Because these results do not take into
account retailer interactions with the supplier, however, they are only partial estimates of how
organic and non-organic margins compare over time. 
[table 3 in here]
 A more complete picture is provided by the estimates in table 4, which introduces
supplier margins and vertical competition.  The results in this table, which are generated using
the GMM estimator given the endogeneity-test results cited above, show that the retail margins
for non-organic apples in the base time period are much closer to the maintained monopoly
assumption (less competitive) than supplier margins (0.495 > 0.078).  This result likely reflects
the general insight that retailers provide more value-added over wholesale acquisition cost than
do suppliers over their own growing costs.  Value-added, in this case, is broadly defined to
include not only time- and place-utility, but market power that derives from advertising,
concentration and other factors.  More importantly, however, the results in table 4 show that
retail margins are more competitive for organic apples relative to regular apples, while supplier
margins are far closer to the Nash assumption for organic apples compared to regular apples. 
Combined, these estimates support our initial hypothesis that a shortage in organic apple supply
has shifted bargaining power from retailers to suppliers for organic apples.  Retail margins are22
lower for organic apples in part because consumers regard prices of organic produce to be critical
barriers to trial and usage.  In order for retailers to help their new organic strategies to succeed,
which are necessary from a broader strategic perspective, they have to charge relatively low
prices on organic produce to induce new consumers to try something that often appears inferior
in the store.  On the other hand, suppliers recognize the importance of high-quality organic
produce to retailers, so are able to charge premiums far above production cost.  Nonetheless, our
results also show that the market power enjoyed by suppliers is indeed eroding over time as new
supply, from both domestic and foreign sources, comes on the market.  Although the rapid
growth in organic apple sales, and the high cost of establishing organic status ensure that
domestic supply will not adjust immediately to meet all of the demand, organic and non-organic
margins appear to be converging. 
[table 4 in here]
With the estimates in table 4, we can also calculate the implied transfer between the
retailer and the supplier under the estimated deviations from the assumed pricing game. 
Essentially, the rule developed in (17) and (18) implies that the total margin (difference between
retail price and production cost) is shared between the retailer and supplier according to the
deviation parameters, ö and è.  From the results in table 4, the retail and supplier deviation
parameters for non-organic apples imply that retailers earn 75.3% of the total margin, while
suppliers earn the remainder, or 24.7%.  However, calculating the same set of parameters for
retailers and suppliers for organic products (in the base period where t = 0) implies that retailers
earn only 7.4% while suppliers earn 92.6%.  For all varieties, the retail margin is higher for non-
organics relative to organics, but the supplier margin is higher for organics in every case. 23
Moreover, consistent with the results shown in table 4, the supplier margin is significantly higher
(in an absolute sense) for organics.  Depending on the investment required to obtain organic
certification, therefore,  we would expect the incentives for suppliers of organic products to be
such that the supply will continue to rise rapidly over time.  Currently, however, the balance of
power clearly still lies with organic apple growers. 
[table 5 in here]
The implications of these results are far-reaching for producers of organic products, and
those who grow non-organics and may be considering the shift to organics.  Any financial
decision to gain organic certification must be supported by accurate net-present-value analysis. 
Therefore, the results shown here may be used to forecast future margins under both a move to
organics and the status quo for a non-organic grower.  While organic production may appear to
be attractive, it will be less so in the future.  More generally, our results provide a clear
demonstration of the incentives importers have to bring in organic products from other countries,
with the attendant food safety and invasive species risk that doing so implies.  Our findings are
also consistent with the dynamics of entry in any industry subject to a new technology.  First-
entrants are likely to earn the greatest rents, while latecomers can expect to earn only competitive
margins.  For agricultural products, we show that much of this early rent and first-mover
advantage is due to bargaining power in a vertical market structure. 
Conclusions
Organics represent an important development in food and agricultural product markets. 24
Consumer demand for products perceived as free of chemicals or contaminants, more protective
of the environment and supportive of local growers – whether or not these are true – has created
an entire new class of products in categories ranging from dairy to produce to meat and beyond. 
Further growth in the supply of organic products, however, depends on the profits available to
growers to do so.  Forecasting future profit growth in a vertical agricultural market, however,
depends critically on how the margin between retail prices and production costs is allocated
between the grower (or supplier more generally) and the retailer.  In this study, we estimate how
this margin is allocated in the U.S. apple market. 
Our econometric model consists of a structural (demand and pricing) description of the
organic and non-organic U.S. apple markets.  The demand model consists of a random-
parameters GEV model in which consumers are assumed to make discrete choices between
organic and non-organic versions of six major apple varieties.  We estimate the GEV model
using retail data from five major U.S. metropolitan markets.  Given the relative shortage of
organic produce described in the media and by produce industry members, our hypothesis is that
organic growers enjoy more market power with retail buyers than do non-organic growers.  Our
findings suggest that retailers earn a greater share of the total margin for non-organic apples, but
the allocation of rents shifts toward suppliers of organic apples.  Most importantly, perhaps, the
proportion of the margin earned by organic suppliers is falling over time.  Consequently, while an
investment in organic certification may seem lucrative now, it may not be as attractive in the
future.  With the continuing growth in organic demand, therefore, margins for organic suppliers
will remain relatively high, but will erode over time. 
Future research in this area would benefit by considering a wider variety of products, and25
retail data from a greater number of markets.  While we consider only apples, organics are also
important in dairy, meat and other types of produce.  The nature of the decision to enter the
organic market is the same in each, but the margin dynamics are likely to be unique.  Further, it
would also be of interest to more closely examine the role of imported organic products in a
model similar to the one used here.  Given the relatively weak constraints placed on imported
organic food products, some of the market power attributed to domestic growers described in this
article is likely eroded by imported produce.  With the high margins available in U.S. organic
markets and the theoretical insights of Giannakas (2002), how much of this imported produce is
truly organic is a matter of some debate. 
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Table 1. Organic Retail Price / Retail-Farm Price-Spread Premiums by Variety and Market: 2006 - 2007
Atlanta Chicago Dallas Los Angeles New York
Price Spread Price Spread Price Spread Price Spread Price Spread
Organic Braeburn 2.102 1.464 1.795 1.157 2.099 1.462 2.174 1.536 2.113 1.475
a
Regular Braeburn 1.522 1.087 1.359 0.924 1.488 1.053 1.317 0.882 1.535 1.100
38.1% 34.7% 32.0% 25.2% 41.1% 38.8% 65.0% 74.2% 37.6% 34.0%
Organic Fuji 1.318 0.594 1.562 0.837 2.056 1.331 1.627 0.902 2.216 1.492
Regular Fuji 1.712 1.209 1.358 0.855 1.574 1.071 1.424 0.920 1.606 1.103
-23.0% -50.9% 15.0% -2.1% 30.6% 24.3% 14.3% -2.0% 38.0% 35.2%
Organic Gala 2.253 1.601 2.033 1.381 1.918 1.266 2.191 1.539 2.034 1.382
Regular Gala 1.354 0.919 1.343 0.909 1.434 1.000 1.212 0.778 1.391 0.957
66.4% 74.1% 51.4% 52.0% 33.7% 26.6% 80.7% 97.9% 46.2% 44.5%
Organic Golden Del. 1.753 1.133 1.793 1.173 2.001 1.381 1.795 1.175 1.922 1.302
Regular Golden Del. 1.475 1.053 1.232 0.811 1.463 1.041 1.361 0.939 1.428 1.006
18.9% 7.6% 45.5% 44.7% 36.8% 32.7% 31.9% 25.1% 34.7% 29.5%
Organic Granny Smith 1.944 1.329 1.795 1.179 1.795 1.179 2.009 1.393 1.996 1.381
Regular Granny Smith 1.443 1.028 1.227 0.812 1.438 1.023 1.340 0.924 1.364 0.948
34.7% 29.3% 46.3% 45.3% 24.8% 15.3% 50.0% 50.8% 46.4% 45.6%
Organic Red Delicious 1.737 1.206 1.652 1.121 1.756 1.225 1.637 1.106 1.759 1.228
Regular Red Del. 1.239 0.870 1.046 0.678 1.153 0.784 1.081 0.712 1.146 0.778
40.3% 38.6% 57.9% 65.4% 52.4% 56.2% 51.5% 55.3% 53.5% 57.9%
 Source: Fresh Look Marketing, Chicago, Il. and Washington Growers Cleaning House, Wenatchee, WA. The spread is calculated as the difference between the
a
average retail price per week and the average PHD price in Washington state. 30
Table 2. Random Parameter / Nested Logit Demand Estimates
Random Parameter Nested Logit Least Squares
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Discount
a 0.225* 2.253 0.278* 4.811
Discount*Price -0.123* -2.085 -0.143* -3.475
Time 0.002* 25.688 0.001* 11.901
Atlanta -0.763* -73.386 -0.759* -58.395
Chicago -0.455* -50.586 -0.457* -32.922
Dallas -0.590* -49.832 -0.586* -44.702
Los Angeles 0.569* 75.517 0.562* 41.511
Organic Braeburn -0.859* -8.116 -0.83* -24.473
Organic Fuji -0.461* -4.579 -0.436* -16.318
Organic Gala -0.416* -4.297 -0.391* -13.421
Organic Golden Del. -0.685* -6.740 -0.663* -21.213
Organic Granny Smith -0.613* -5.408 -0.592* -19.454
Organic Red Del.  -0.543* -5.618 -0.524* -18.805
Regular Braeburn -0.224 -1.802 -0.215* -9.876
Regular Fuji -0.074 -0.529 -0.062* -2.921
Regular Gala -0.049 -0.414 -0.046* -2.308
Regular Golden Del. -0.118 -0.681 -0.108* -5.237
Regular Granny Smith -0.021 -0.116 -0.012 -0.622
First Quarter 0.158* 16.483 0.025* 2.114
Second Quarter -0.073* -7.011 -0.265* -22.569
Third Quarter -0.309* -33.216 -0.517* -43.883
J ó 0.850* 240.401 0.851* 188.879
Means of Random Parameters
Price -0.365* -11.268 -0.246* -13.302
Constant -0.440* -4.432 -0.291* -10.544
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters
Price 0.099* 43.475
Constant 0.120* 28.942
Determinants of Random Parameter Means
Price (Age) 0.001* 3.441
Price (Education) 0.008* 5.960
Constant (Age) -0.001 -1.456





 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level.  Estimates are obtained using simulated maximum
a
likelihood with 50 Halton-sequence draws. 32
Table 2a. Own and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix: Atlanta Market, RPNL Model
Elasticity of Row with Respect to Column: 
Organic Varieties Non-Organic Varieties












O. Braeburn -2.248 0.054 0.017 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.116 0.238 0.293 0.257 0.403 0.588
O. Fuji 0.002 -2.150 0.017 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.113 0.233 0.287 0.251 0.395 0.575
O. Gala 0.003 0.069 -2.841 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.147 0.303 0.372 0.327 0.513 0.748
O. Golden Del. 0.019 0.017 0.007 -2.524 0.130 0.268 0.329 0.289 0.453 0.661 0.432 0.691
O. Granny Smith 0.002 0.063 0.020 0.006 -2.615 0.011 0.135 0.278 0.341 0.299 0.470 0.685
O. Red Del. 0.002 0.049 0.015 0.005 0.006 -2.021 0.104 0.215 0.264 0.232 0.363 0.530
R. Braeburn 0.003 0.069 0.022 0.007 0.008 0.012 -2.714 0.303 0.372 0.326 0.512 0.747
R. Fuji 0.003 0.078 0.024 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.167 -2.896 0.421 0.370 0.580 0.846
R. Gala 0.003 0.068 0.021 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.145 0.299 -2.454 0.322 0.505 0.737
R. Golden Del. 0.003 0.074 0.023 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.159 0.328 0.403 -2.743 0.555 0.809
R. Granny Smith 0.003 0.071 0.022 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.152 0.312 0.384 0.337 -2.422 0.770
R. Red Del. 0.002 0.053 0.017 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.113 0.233 0.286 0.251 0.394 -1.625
 Own-price elasticities are calculated using the equation: 
a
 and cross-price elasticities using: 
1j  where â  is the discount/price interaction parameter and prices, shares and conditional shares are evaluated at group (market and product) means.  Non-IIA
ij substitution is generated through the individual-specific price-response parameter, á .33
Table 3. Retail Margin Model: Least Squares and GMM 
Least Squares GMM
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Grocery Wages
a 13.712* 23.555 10.196* 19.756
Retail Mgmt Wages -0.964* -11.476 -0.596* -5.962
Electricity 0.361* 4.538 0.215* 2.521
Retail Margin 0.037* 3.096 0.164* 5.575
Retail Margin * Organic -0.105* -4.253 -0.563* -9.066
Retail Margin * Organic * Time 0.001 1.654 0.001 1.546
Organic Braeburn -2.542* -15.383 -1.958* -12.032
Organic Fuji -2.927* -17.733 -2.395* -14.812
Organic Gala -2.525* -15.296 -2.062* -12.812
Organic Golden Delicious -2.725* -16.507 -2.163* -13.318
Organic Granny Smith -2.666* -16.148 -2.106* -12.989
Organic Red Delicious  -2.782* -16.847 -2.231* -13.777
Regular Braeburn -2.921* -17.693 -2.188* -13.243
Regular Fuji -2.898* -17.557 -2.142* -12.934
Regular Gala -3.016* -18.279 -2.253* -13.616
Regular Golden Delicious -2.959* -17.938 -2.211* -13.365
Regular Granny Smith -2.983* -18.069 -2.243* -13.542





 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level. The chi-square statistic is a LR ratio test for the least
a
squares model and a quasi-likelihood ratio test for the GMM model.   Table 4. Retail and Wholesale Margin Model: GMM Estimates
Retail Model Wholesale Model
Variable Estimate t-ratio Variable Estimate t-ratio
Grocery Wages 9.945* 17.909 Ag. Chemicals -0.060 -0.894
a
Retail Mgmt Wages -0.637* -6.228 Fuel -0.144* -3.880
Electricity 0.168* 1.989 Ag. Services 14.803* 31.051
Retail Margin 0.495* 17.391 Wholesale Margin 0.078* 2.108
Ret. Margin * Organic -0.451* -7.960 Whls. Margin * Organic 1.137* 6.414
Ret. Margin * Organic * Time -0.001 -0.514 Whls. Margin * Organic * Time -0.012* -11.233
O. Braeburn -1.486* -9.156 O. Braeburn -1.511* -23.524
O. Fuji -1.952* -12.065 O. Fuji -1.406* -21.839
O. Gala -1.681* -10.420 O. Gala -1.447* -22.576
O. Granny Smith -1.767* -10.887 O. Granny Smith -1.477* -22.985
O. Golden Delicious -1.696* -10.463 O. Golden Delicious -1.488* -23.217
O. Red Delicious -1.826* -11.276 O. Red Delicious -1.575* -24.237
R. Braeburn -1.815* -11.114 R. Braeburn -1.686* -27.015
R. Fuji -1.738* -10.621 R. Fuji -1.659* -26.408
R. Gala -1.880* -11.500 R. Gala -1.692* -27.003
R. Granny Smith -1.846* -11.293 R. Granny Smith -1.729* -27.526
R. Golden Delicious -1.892* -11.582 R. Golden Delicious -1.751* -27.602
R. Red Delicious -2.067* -12.692 R. Red Delicious -1.738* -27.728
 (Organic) 0.056  (Organic) 1.216






 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level.  The parameters   and  are fitted values for the retail and supplier conduct parameters,
a
respectively. The chi-square statistic is a quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) test of the maintained GMM model against a null alternative.   Table 5. Implied Retail and Wholesale Margins
Organic Regular
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Braeburn Retail 
a 0.041 0.017 0.190 0.079
Wholesale 0.419 0.102 0.018 0.007
Fuji Retail  0.032 0.023 0.184 0.087
Wholesale 0.462 0.158 0.022 0.007
Gala Retail  0.047 0.019 0.165 0.076
Wholesale 0.398 0.111 0.018 0.004
Golden Del. Retail  0.038 0.013 0.181 0.061
Wholesale 0.377 0.117 0.019 0.006
Granny Smith Retail  0.039 0.017 0.181 0.054
Wholesale 0.378 0.080 0.019 0.003
Red Del.  Retail  0.037 0.013 0.144 0.061
Wholesale 0.328 0.068 0.015 0.003
 Margins are estimated using equations (17) and (18) under the maintained model of wholesale Stackelberg
a
leadership.  All margins are in cents per pound calculated at the base period (t = 0).